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Abstract: The European Charter of Local Self-Government, which 
was ratified by almost all European member states, provides for the decentral-
ization of power and the transfer of competences and financial resources to 
local communities as well as extends local authorities’ tax collection and 
budgetary spending responsibilities. In reality, however, the increased spend-
ing responsibilities and the limited self-financing powers of the municipalities 
in our country raise the question of the degree of their dependence on the cen-
tral government. This paper presents a survey which aims to measure and as-
sess the degree of tax autonomy of local governments in Bulgaria compared 
to their counterparts from other EU member states by means of a set of indi-
cators and thus to determine one of the effects of fiscal decentralization – lo-
cal self-government’s tax autonomy.  
Keywords: municipalities, fiscal autonomy, fiscal decentralization, 
local self-government budget, revenue.   
JEL: H71, H72. 
 
*     *    * 
 
ixty-five years after the establishment of a new system of relationships 
among the various levels of government in Europe with the adoption of 
the European Charter of Municipal Liberties, which started  the institu-
tional reform, fiscal decentralization is now a fact in Europe. Adopted initially 
by only 16 countries, the European Charter of Local Self-Government has 
already been ratified by all European countries except Belarus and Moldova. 
Its underlying principles extend the powers of local governments to ‘manage a 
substantial part of public affairs’ (European Charter of Self-Government, Art. 
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3, 1985) in the interest of the society. This requires a vertical transfer of rights 
and obligations to the local authorities and the associated extension of their 
tax collection and budgetary spending responsibilities.  
The Republic of Bulgaria adopted a policy for extending the autonomy 
of local governments and adopting the principles of local self-government by 
ratifying the European Charter for Local Self-Government, amending its Con-
stitution, enforcing the Local Taxes and Fees Act (LTFA) (Local Taxes and 
Fees Act, 2017), and adopting a Decentralization Concept and Strategy and 
other related documents. Followed for more than 25 years, this policy is sup-
posed to have positive effects for both the society in general and for the local 
self-government and thus result in better public services. The increased spend-
ing responsibilities and the limited self-financing powers of the municipalities 
in our country raise the question of the degree of their dependence on the cen-
tral government. This is why we conducted survey which aimed to measure 
and assess the degree of tax autonomy of local governments in Bulgaria com-
pared to their counterparts from other EU member states by means of a set of 
indicators for the last 10 years (2007-2016). The selected economies (Bulgar-
ia, Estonia, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia) have similar characteristics - 
they are unitary states with similar political and socio-economic ‘history’: all 
of them were members of the former ‘Eastern Bloc’ and after its dissolution in 
1989 set on the path of transition from a highly centralized planning system to 
a decentralized free-market economy, facing a number of challenges.  
According to Bulgaria’s Public Finance Act (Public Finance Act, Art. 
45 and 52, 2017), municipal budgets shall include revenue from own sources 
and transfers from the central budget. The latter are made due to the limited 
sources of own revenues of the municipalities and are intended to ensure a 
minimum level of local services in municipalities (Vladimirova, Т., Naidenov. 
L., 2011). Logically, the transfers delegated from the central budget, although 
spent locally, limit the autonomy of the municipal governments to spend these 
funds at their own discretion. In turn, the revenue from own sources is spent 
on local activities at the discretion of the City Council regarding their type, 
quantity and quality. (Zahariev, 2012). Municipalities collect revenue from 
the following own sources: local taxes; fees; services and rights granted by 
the municipality; disposal of municipal property; fines and pecuniary sanc-
tions; interest and penalties; other proceeds; aid and donations (Public 
Finance Act, Art. 45 and 52, 2017). Therefore, the degree of local govern-
ments’ independence from the central government depends to a large extent 
on the capacity of each municipality to accumulate enough own revenues to 
cover its spending for public goods and services. We should point out, how-
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ever, that the degree of fiscal autonomy (independence) does not depend only 
on the collection of revenue, although it is one of its main aspects. It also de-
pends to a large degree on: 
• The right of the municipalities to impose taxes;  
• The right of the municipalities to set tax rates; 
• The right of the municipalities to set tax deductions, preferences, 
and exemptions;  
• The right of the municipalities to collect taxes (Naidenov, L., 2012, 
стр. 131)  
According to our country’s legal framework, municipalities are al-
lowed to set the rates only to local tax observing the lower and upper limits 
stipulated in the LTFA as well as to collect the taxes specified in the same act 
via  their own tax offices. Moreover, the LTFA specifies the types of tax the 
municipalities are allowed to levy and prohibits their modification or the im-
position of other taxes. This means that regardless of the optimization and the 
level of collectability of the taxes, municipalities are deprived from sources of 
own revenue and this applies  especially for the smaller and less densely pop-
ulated municipalities where the standard of living is low (which are predomi-
nant in Bulgaria) and are therefore their local governments are highly depend-
ent on the central government.  
The degree of tax autonomy (the level of dependence of a local gov-
ernment on the central government) is measured by means of the following 
indicators: significance of local revenues, significance of local tax revenues 
and property taxes, tax decentralization coefficient, mobilization of local re-
sources and share of tax revenue in local spending (Naidenov, L., 2012, pp. 
143-153) (Aristovnik, 2012). The dynamic and comparative analyses of these 
indicators would outline the tax autonomy trends in the Republic of Bulgaria 
compared to other EU member states. It should be noted that the tax systems 
of the selected five countries are not (and cannot be) identical with regard to 
their local taxes but nevertheless share some common features: the local gov-
ernments in these countries have the right to collect certain taxes and receive 
transfers from the central budget. Without claiming complete comprehensive-
ness, the table below presents the structure of the local taxes in the five coun-
tries: 
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Table 1 
Local taxes in selected EU member states  
Bulgaria 
(unit: 
obshtina, 264) 
Estonia (unit: 
vald, 193) 
Romania 
(unit: 
commune, 
2861) 
Slovakia (unit: 
obce, 2792) 
Hungary (unit: 
телепуулишек, 
3175) (Council 
of European 
Municipalities 
and Regions, 
2013) 
Real estate tax Advertisement tax 
Real estate (land 
and buildings) 
tax 
Real estate tax Building tax 
Inheritance tax Road and street closure tax Vehicle tax 
Tax on rent in-
comes Property tax 
Donation tax Motor vehicle tax  Dog ownership tax 
Local corporate 
(business) tax 
Transfer tax Animal tax  Tax on the use of public areas Tourist tax 
Vehicle tax Entertainment tax  
Tax on operation 
of vending ma-
chines 
 
Lump-sum tax 
 
Taxi service tax 
  
Tax on vehicle 
parking in histori-
cal parts of cities 
 
Tourist tax   Nuclear facilities tax  
Source: The Ministries of Finance of Bulgaria, Estonia, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, 
http://www.minfin.bg/, https://www.rahandusministeerium.ee/en, 
http://www.mfinante.gov.ro/trezorengl.html?pagina=domenii, 
http://www.finance.gov.sk/en/, http://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-for-national-
economy) 
 
The comparison of the local taxes in Bulgaria, Estonia, Romania, Slo-
vakia, and Hungary shown in the table above reveals the following similarities 
and differences: 
• The local taxes levied in Bulgaria and Slovakia have the broadest 
tax base.  
The fiscal systems in our country and in Slovakia are based on eight 
local taxes which differ in terms of subject, object and tax base. Unlike them, 
the Hungarian and Romanian fiscal systems are narrower in scope and include 
four and two local taxes respectively. Therefore we might assume that a 
broader tax base would ensure more revenue because, ceteris paribus, it would 
Economic Archive 3/2018 
 
7 
include more tax subjects. This assumption may verified by means of a dy-
namic correlation comparative analysis.  
• Regarding the objects of taxation, property and service taxes are 
more common than income and turnover taxes.  
All the countries included in this study, bar Estonia, have imposed 
some form of a local tax on the real estate property to generate revenues for 
the local government’s budgets. The same applies to the motor vehicle tax as 
such a local tax has not been imposed only in Slovakia and Hungary.2 In Bul-
garia, Estonia and Slovakia local taxes are levied to certain services, such as 
entertainment services, services rendered by self-employed providers, use of 
public spaces, etc. Local income taxes are levied only in Hungary (local cor-
porate tax) and Slovakia (tax on rent incomes).   
• Property taxes are the main source of revenue to the local budgets.  
Real estate` property (land, buildings or building permits) is subject to 
local taxes in all countries bar Estonia. Movable property (vehicles, works of 
art, gaming machines and vending machines) are subject to different local 
taxes in the studied countries. It should be noted that the possession of a pet 
(usually a dog) is taxed in Estonia, Slovakia and Bulgaria (although in our 
country the tax is qualified as a fee).   
• Local governments usually impose taxes on the possession of real 
estates, transfers of titles, and rendering of services (entertainment, hotel, taxi, 
repair, sales through vending machines, etc.)  
In some of the countries there are some specific taxes, such as the tax 
on the broadcasting/publishing of advertisements in Estonia, and the tax on 
the stay of vehicles in historical parts of cities and the tax on nuclear facilities 
in Slovakia.  
The above differences features of the local tax systems provoked our 
interest to measure the degree of tax autonomy of local governments in terms 
of defining their priorities and objectives for spending at local level. Their 
autonomy is an important factor for improving their efficiency in allocation of 
resources, ensuring social equality and raising the standard of living of their 
communities.  
The ‘significance of local revenue’ indicator is the ratio of the local 
revenue to the national GDP and shows the significance of local redistribution 
processes for the national economy. Chart 1 clearly shows that during the 
studied period  (2007 – 2016) between 6.3 and 9.5 percent of Bulgaria’s GDP 
were redistributed via municipal budgets. These values are lower than the EU 
                                                          
2 This does not mean that in these countries the ownership and use of a vehicle is 
exempt from taxation. Vehicles may be subject to taxes that generate revenue for the central 
budget or to certain fees. However, such taxes and fees are not covered by this study.  
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average value as well as the values in Hungary, Estonia and Romania and are 
higher only than Slovakia’s values. During the first half of the studied period 
only the values of Hungary approximate the EU average, reaching their peak 
of 12% in 2011 (which is higher than the EU average) and then rapidly declin-
ing to 6% in 2016. This is due to the nominal decrease of the financial re-
sources available at local level at relative to the country's GDP growth. In the 
years after the economic recession, the ratio of local revenue to GDP in-
creased in four of the five surveyed countries, including Bulgaria. Despite the 
increase of its nominal values, this cannot be considered a reliable indicator 
for greater regional autonomy because of the annual transfers from the central 
budget that were made in each country. We would be able to measure their 
regional autonomy more accurately if we disregard these transfers and take 
into account only the revenue from own sources, i.e. if we redefine the above 
indicator as ‘significance of local tax revenue’. Thus the indicator will show 
the significance of local budget revenues from local taxes for the redistribu-
tion processes in the national economy. Higher values are indicative of a 
greater autonomy of local governments due to the larger amounts of own re-
sources at the disposal of the local parliament (municipal council).    
 
 
Source: Eurostat, author’s calculations 
 
Figure 1. Significance of local tax revenue in selected EU member states 
 
The analysis of the above indicator reveals an important feature of the 
local governments in the surveyed countries – the low percentage of local tax 
revenue, which results in values equal or lower to one percent of the national 
GDP (see Figure 1.) An exception from this trend is Hungary, where the val-
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ues are close to the EU average values and vary between 2.1% and 4.4%. The 
relative share of local tax revenues in our country after our accession to the 
EU until 2016 varied between 0.7 % and 0.9 % - values that are higher only 
from those in Slovakia. The trend in Romania is relatively stable with values 
fluctuating at about 1% of the country’s GDP. The same applies to Estonia as 
well, except for the last three years, when the values were equal or even lower 
to those in Bulgaria.  
 
Source: Eurostat, author’s calculations 
 
Figure 2. Significance of local tax revenue in selected EU member states 
 
The comparison of the two indicators (‘significance of local revenue’ 
and ‘significance of local tax revenue’) clearly shows that local governments 
are strongly dependent on the central government not only in Bulgaria. For 
example, the revenues of local governments in Bulgaria in 2016 amounted to 
EUR 3.35 bln., of which the revenue from local taxes was only EUR 447.8 
mln. (or 13%). In other words, the value of the  ‘significance of local revenue’ 
indicator was 7% while the value of the ‘significance of local tax revenue’ 
indicator was only 0.9%. In the same year, the local governments in Estonia 
(considered a role model) had lower tax autonomy than the Bulgarian ones – 
of EUR 2 billion in revenue only EUR 75 million (3.7%) was from local 
taxes. The low share of GDP redistributed through local taxes shows not only 
that the effects of the fiscal decentralization in the selected countries are 
controversial, but also that municipalities do not have sufficient financial ca-
pacity for autonomous provision of sufficient and adequate public services.  
Disregarding the central transfers as a source of local revenue lets us 
measure fiscal decentralization by means of the ratio local revenue to total 
revenue in the public sector. The results of this dynamic analysis are shown in 
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Figure 3 and prove the conclusions from the previous analyses. The low 
amount of revenue accumulated from local taxes, which, except in Hungary, 
is below one percent of the national GDP, has a substantial impact on the fis-
cal decentralization coefficient. It fluctuates between 0.95% and 6.5% and is 
continuously below the EU average of about 10 percent.3 Bulgaria ranks third 
in terms of local tax revenue compared to total tax revenue – in 2016 its fiscal 
decentralization coefficient was 3.2%, which is the highest reported value, the 
lowest being 2.6% in 2007. For our country there is a trend for increase of this 
value while such a trend is not observed for the other four countries. More 
pronounced tax autonomy was measured in Romania, where it varies between 
3.2% and 3.9% with higher values in the beginning of the survey period, and 
in Hungary (between 5.6% and 11.2%), where it decreases during the period 
as well. Compared to the average European values, the dependence of local 
governments on the central government in the other two countries is even 
more pronounced - in 2016 in Estonia, for example, the local tax revenue 
amounted to only EUR 75 million (or 1%) out of EUR 7.2 billion total tax 
revenue. 
 
 
Source: Eurostat, author’s calculations 
 
Figure 3. Fiscal decentralization coefficients of selected EU member 
states 
The outlined trends regarding the rate of tax decentralization imply 
that not only in our country, but in all the other countries included in the sur-
vey, the tax revenues are highly centralized, which makes the local govern-
ments in these countries highly dependent on the central governments in terms 
                                                          
3 Except in Hungary in 2007.  
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of their budget spending objectives and casts doubt on the success of the fiscal 
decentralization with regard to their tax autonomy and the implementation of 
the LFTA provision that municipalities shall ‘manage a substantial part of the 
public affairs’.   
Given the fact that taxes are levied on various tax objects (e.g. income, 
consumption/turnover, property, assets, etc.), the next stage of our research 
focused on real estate taxes as a source of revenue for local governments. We 
measured the ratio of the revenue from property and title transfer taxes to the 
total  tax revenue as an indicator of tax autonomy. Property taxes are sources 
of local revenue in all the countries included in the survey. In Romania prop-
erty tax is the only source of revenue for local governments and in Estonia it 
is the second most important source of all local taxes (see Table 1). These 
specific characteristics affect the next two indicators (‘significance of proper-
ty taxes’ and ‘mobilization of local resources’) - and should be taken into 
account when assessing tax autonomy. The significance of property taxes as 
sources of municipal tax revenue can be evaluated by comparing them to the 
total local tax revenue, but this goes beyond the scope of this study.  
 
 
Source: Eurostat, author’s calculations 
 
Figure 4. ‘Mobilization of local resources’ coefficient in selected EU 
member states 
 
The ‘significance of property taxes’ indicator, which is the ratio of 
property tax revenue to the country’s GDP, is relatively stable, with values 
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to EU average of 0.2%, and indicates good tax autonomy. The second indica-
tor (‘mobilization of local resources’), which is the ratio of property tax reve-
nue to the total tax revenue from the public sector, has good values in Roma-
nia, Hungary and Bulgaria. In Romania, the coefficient exceeds the average 
European values in most of the survey years (except in 2007 and 2008) and 
varies between 0.5 and 0.6 percent, while in Hungary the highest values were 
reported in the first half of the survey period and in some years the indicator 
reaches 0.7%. During the second half of the survey period, the coefficient in 
our country has the highest values compared to the values  results of the other 
countries as well as the EU average. This shows that property taxes are not 
very significant for the tax autonomy of local governments due to the low 
revenues from property taxes, which have low rates, the various  exemptions 
from this type of taxes, and, in some cases, preference to other forms of taxa-
tion.  
As it has already become clear, one aspect of local government’s tax 
autonomy is the ability of municipalities (local governments) to have suffi-
cient financial basis for independent spending on activities and projects with-
out the financial support of the central government. Such an autonomy would 
widen the scope of local activities and/or ensure more financial resources for 
the existing public services. Therefore, the most adequate measure of the level 
of tax autonomy the ratio of the revenue from local taxes and the local budget 
spending. It shows the level of shortage of local tax revenue and the need of 
transfers from the central budget to cover local spending.  
 
 
Source: Eurostat, author’s calculations 
 
Figure 5. Local spending/tax revenue ratio in selected EU member states 
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The result of the analysis (Figure 5) shows the comparison of the se-
lected countries with the other EU members states, where the percentage of 
local spending covered with local tax revenue is between 31% and 38%. Bul-
garia’s ratio is far below the EU average varying between 8.2% and 13.5% 
and is similar to the values in Romania and Slovakia. Hungary ranks first 
among the five countries in terms of tax autonomy - the lowest reported value 
was in 2010 (19.4%) and the highest  was at the beginning and end of the sur-
vey period (37,9%), when it reached the EU average. The lowest values were 
reported in Estonia, where only 3 to 5 percent of the local spending is covered 
by local tax revenues. This means that local governments are strongly de-
pendent on the central governments in terms of financial resource to cover 
their spending.  
The coefficient analysis over the period from 2007 to 2016 leads to the 
following conclusions regarding local governments’ tax autonomy in the five 
selected countries: 
First: The ‘significance of local revenue’ indicator, which shows the 
significance of local redistribution processes (transfers + taxes) at local level 
for the national economy, has a positive trend in Bulgaria and Slovakia, due to 
its marked growth during the survey period. However, the fact that it is calcu-
lated including the transfers from the central government, makes it unreliable 
as a measure of tax autonomy.   
Second: When the above indicator is redefined as ‘significance of local 
tax revenue’ by excluding those transfers, we could determine an important 
characteristic of local governments in the selected countries – the amount of 
their local tax revenues does not exceed one percent of the national GDP 
compared to the EU average value of about 4% – a clear indicators that the 
local governments in these countries are strongly dependent on their central 
governments. 
Third: The ‘tax decentralization’ cоefficient ranks Hungary first, fol-
lowed by Romania. However, both countries’ values are lower than the EU 
average. Such indicator values show that the tax systems in these countries are 
highly centralized.   
Fourth: Property tax is the main source of local tax revenue in each of 
the selected countries although its share of the national GDP and total tax rev-
enue vary among the selected countries. During the second half of the sur-
veyed period it had highest values in Bulgaria and Romania.  
Fifth: Local governments rely heavily on transfers from the central 
governments to cover their public spending and thus are not financially inde-
pendent.  
The effects of the implementation of the principles of local self-
government should be considered in various aspects: provision of better pub-
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lic services, raising the living standard, administrative, financial and tax effi-
ciency, etc. Although the level of tax autonomy is but one of these effects, it 
affects all  of the above-mentioned effects. The analysis and evaluation of tax 
autonomy indicators puts into question the effects of the fiscal decentraliza-
tion in relation to this aspect and the implementation of ECSG’s principle of 
‘managing a substantial part of the public affairs’ by municipalities. The 
strong centralization of tax revenues, the growing spending responsibilities of 
municipalities and the limited opportunities for self-financing make local 
governments strongly dependent on the central government to cover their 
public spending. This requires a reorganization of Bulgaria’s current fiscal 
system and central funding policy through implementation of some good Eu-
ropean practices in order to bring the level of its local governments’ tax au-
tonomy closer to the EU average level.   
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